PPP项目两阶段招标激励机制博弈分析

摘要

政府在 PPP 项目中采用两阶段招标以期发挥潜在社会资本方的技术创新优势,但由于政府和投标人之间存在信息不对称,可能导致不具有技术优势的投标人中标.通过构建投标人博弈模型分析两阶段招标对社会资本方投入新技术的激励机制.研究结果表明,PPP项目两阶段招标能够保证建设市场中对该项目具有技术优势的社会资本方中标,而且激励其努力投入新技术.然而,当新技术具有不确定性时,两阶段招标可能导致投标人选择投入可靠性较低的新技术.此时,政府可以设置适当的违约金抑制投标人的投机行为,保证两阶段招标的效率.%Present Governments employe two-stage bidding to facilitate the use of new technologies developed by potential bidders.However,the information asymmetry between the governments and the bidders may result in a winning bidder without technological advantages.This paper constructs a game model to investigate the incentive mechanism for bidders with technological advantages to develop new technologies to improve project efficiency.The results show that the two-stage bidding ensures the bidder with technological advantages to win the bid,which motivates bidders to develop new technologies.However,considering uncertainties in the new technology,bidders might strategically adopt the new technology with a low level of liability to win the bid.Finally,we analyze the role of liquidated damages in deterring the strategic behaviors of bidders and improving the bidding efficiency.