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信号交叉口驾驶员行为博弈分析

     

摘要

为了研究车辆通过信号交叉口时的驾驶员决策行为,从博弈角度出发,根据影响驾驶员决策行为的性格因素,以及不同策略之间的势因素,通过时间细化,建立基于重复博弈下影响驾驶员决策行为的效用函数.通过驾驶员在行进过程中的决策行为,分析驾驶员获得的效用,得到动态博弈中驾驶员的最优决策.同时通过实例验证模型的可行性.例证表明:第一,对于冲动型的驾驶员在决策初始时刻最可能选择减速策略;第二,温和型的驾驶员选择加速或减速策略;第三,谨慎型的驾驶员选择减速策略.%In order to study the decision-making behavior of drivers at the signalized intersection, this study estab-lishes a utility function of drivers' driving behavior by reference to dynamic reduplicate game theory based on the drivers'personality that affects decision-making behavior and time refinement, and the relative potential factors among different strategies . According to the drivers'decision-making behavior in the process of driving and ana-lyzing the utility of the drivers'decision-making behavior, the drivers'optimal decision behaviors in a dynamic game are obtained, and the feasibility of the model is simultaneously verified. Experiments show that during deci-sion-making①impulsive drivers are more willing to choose deceleration strategy;②mild drivers prefer accelera-tion strategy or deceleration strategy;and③cautious drivers choose deceleration strategy.

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