村委会选举中的贿选：两种信任的绞合

摘要

The high stock of trust resources in the village does’t necessarily promote the positive distribution of political power of the grassroots. The informal code of conduct and reciprocal specification build a rural interpersonal trust network.It binds the voters and the candidates together to form the moral community and the interests community. This provides an informal institution basis for bribery. The institution trust is manipulated to become the candidate’s tool of avoiding risks. Its low level respond to the demands of voters forces the voters in turn to depend on interpersonal trust. The high-energy rural interpersonal trust extrudes institution trust space,eventually forming the“accelerating effect”of bribery. Therefore, cultivating the new type of rural community organizations and change the credit allocation mechanism from clansman-type to institutionalization-type may effectively prevent and curb bribery.%村庄信任资源存量高并不必然促进基层社区政治权力的正向分配，由非正式行为准则和互惠规范构建的乡村人际信任网络将选民与贿选者捆绑，形成道德共同体和利益共同体，为贿选提供非正式制度依托。制度信任被操纵成为贿选者规避风险的工具，加之它回应选民诉求的迟钝和乏力，迫使选民转而依附人际信任。高能的乡村人际信任不断挤占制度信任空间，形成纵容贿选的“加速数效应”。为此，培育新型农村社区组织，转变宗族式信任分配机制为制度化的信任分配机制可有效预防和遏止乡村贿选。