零售商主导的供应商创新投入的模糊期权契约

摘要

A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer is considered in this paper. To coordinate such a supply well, a novel option contract mechanism is established. In this mechanism, the retailer is the leader and proposes the option contract, while the supplier is the follower and purchases the option. The mathematical expectation of the inverse function of the credibility function is adopted for optimization. The simulation experiment demonstrates that the proposed mechanism can coordinate the supply chain well.%考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,在此供应链系统中建立了一种新型的期权契约机制.在此契约中,零售商处于供应链的领导地位,而供应商处于追随地位,零售商提出期权契约而供应商购买期权.在模糊环境下零售商和供应商之间通过共同分担供应商的创新投入成本的期权契约进行协调,首次提出了可信性函数的反函数表达式及其数学期望的表达式,并通过此期望值函数对此问题进行了优化.研究表明,创新投入共担的期权契约能够实现零售商主导下的供应链的协调.通过仿真验证了研究结论.