不确定条件下供应链期权契约风险分担模型

摘要

Supply chain option contract is one of the important ways to respond to demand uncertainty. However, such a contract brings new risks into a supply chain. While dealing with the problem of risk sharing in supply chain option contract, decision makers are advised to determine option price and share risks by bargaining power. In this paper, the risk sharing by using option contract is studied for a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. With the effect of bargaining power on order quantity, production scheduling, and profit being considered, a risk sharing model is proposed. Based on the model, a-nalysis shows that, by option contract, it can increase the expected profit for both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer's bargaining power is increased, the retailer's order quantity increases, but option quantity decreases. When the manufacturer's bargaining power is decreased, the total expected profit in supply chain is reduced. Simulation experiments verify the obtained results. Based on the results, suggestions are made for decision making of option price.%供应链期权契约是应对市场需求不确定性的一种重要途径,然而期权价格又给供应链带来了新的风险.针对供应链期权契约的风险分担问题,提出了根据谈判能力协商确定期权价格从而达到风险分担的方法.在市场不确定条件下,以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,建立了基于谈判能力的供应链期权契约风险分担模型,分析了谈判能力对供应链订购量、生产安排以及期望收益的影响.研究发现,期权契约可以提高供应链各成员的期望收益,随着制造商谈判能力的增强,零售商的订单数量增加,期权数量减少,制造商的谈判能力降低了供应链的总期望收益.通过数值仿真分析,进一步验证了通过谈判分担期权契约风险的有效性,获得了对制定供应链期权价格具有指导意义的研究结论.