基于灰色博弈的中小企业创新激励机制优化分析

摘要

针对我国中小企业缺乏创新动力的现状,对企业创新的智猪博弈模型进行了改进分析.首先建立变量化的智猪博弈模型,根据决策变量的不确定性,引入区间灰数来描述政府奖励与智猪博弈模型中的收益值.然后通过设定区间灰数优势度打破(创新,模仿)的传统均衡解,逐步优化直至得到最优均衡解,使中小企业的绝对占优策略变为"创新".将政府奖励作为其中的控制变量,实现对中小企业创新的有效激励.最后用大企业与小企业技术创新博弈的实例进行分析,验证了所提方法的有效性与合理性.%Aiming at the current situation of lacking innovation motivation and enthusiasm of our country 's small and medium-sized enterprises,this paper improves and analyzes the boxed pigs'game model for enterprise innovation. First,the variational boxed pigs'game model is established. Then,according to the uncertainty of the decision variables,the interval grey numbers are introduced to describe the government rewards and the profits in boxed pigs' game model. Then we break the traditional equilibrium solution by setting the interval grey numbers'superiority degree,and gradually get more optimal equilibrium solution until get the most optimal equilibrium solution,and the absolute dominant strategy of small and medium-sized enterprises is"innovation". Using government rewards as the control variables,the paper realizes effective motivation for small and medium-sized enterprises to make innovation. Finally,by analyzing an example of a large enterprise and a small enterprise technology innovation game,the paper verifies the validity and rationality of the given method.