首页> 中文期刊> 《技术经济与管理研究》 >中小企业创新机制系统分析r——基于博弈论视角

中小企业创新机制系统分析r——基于博弈论视角

         

摘要

Based on Game Theory, the innovational mechanism of SMEs is analyzed systematically. According to the Boxed Pigs Game Theory, the optimal developing strategy for SMEs is not innovation but imitation, but the theory does not conform to the reality, which is that the government encourages SME to innovate, and most SMEs innovates actively. The current situation is called"paradox of SME innovation". To resolve the paradox, Game Theory is used, based on the analysis of sequential rationality and reverse induction. There are four factors, which influence the choice of innovation mechanisms for SMEs, including the cost of innovation, innovation resources, government policies and market size. According to their own actual circumstance, SMEs should take advantage of governm-ent support policies to choose whether to develop innovation. Particularly , SMEs can hold different dominant strategies in variety circu-mstance, including the high cost of innovation, the low cost of innovation and a huge potential market, and the strategies are survival strategy by imitation, the focus strategy based on competitive advantage through innovation and sale, the development strategy based on using innovative technology to develop new market.%文章基于博弈论视角, 对中小企业的创新机制进行了系统分析. 首先, 根据智猪博弈理论, 发现中小企业的最优发展战略不是创新而是模仿, 这与现实中政府鼓励中小企业创新以及多数中小企业积极创新的情况不相符, 形成"中小企业创新悖论". 为化解该悖论, 论文采用博弈树方法, 依据序贯理性和逆向归纳进行分析, 发现中小企业创新机制的选择受到创新成本、 创新资源、 政府政策、 市场规模等四大因素影响, 企业应根据自身实际, 积极利用各项政府扶植政策, 进行创新博弈选择.具体而言, 中小企业在高创新成本、 低创新成本和潜在市场规模巨大三种情况下的不同占优战略为: 模仿为主的生存战略, 出售创新技术的竞争优势聚焦战略以及自用创新技术开拓蓝海的发展战略.

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