农村产权抵押贷款的三方动态博弈

摘要

为了探明农户、信用社以及政府在农村产权抵押贷款模式发展初期的相互影响关系，基于博弈论视角，构建了农户、信用社以及政府在农村产权抵押贷款模式发展初期的三方不完全信息动态博弈模型，并以此求解出满足三方利益最大化的纳什均衡解，由此提出建议：应完善对农户的激励及惩罚机制，并完善对信用社的监管制度；在农村金融人才队伍建设上应积极建立贷款代理人制度；银行与保险公司应加强涉农信贷与涉农保险的合作，其也同时应与政府合作，加强农村信用体系建设，改善农村金融生态环境。%The trilateral incomplete information dynamic game model was built based on the game theory to study the relationship among farmers,credit cooperative and government during the early development stage of rural mortgage of property rights to obtain an equilibrium solution which can maximize the game participants'benefits.The suggestions to perfect incentive and punishment mechanism to farmers,to improve the regulatory system to credit cooperatives,to build the loan agent system in rural area,to enhance cooperation between banks and insurance companies,to reinforce rural credit system and to improve rural financial ecological environment were proposed in the paper.