N人博弈情形中的行业失德与治理--以我国食品行业为例

摘要

Based on the Cournot model and the background of collective misconduct of Chinese food industry, the paper proves that enterprise’s profit-driven behavior will induce industrial collective misconduct,by expanding the duopoly model to the n-person game model in which food enterprises decide their product quality and quantity simultaneously. Although different levels of governmental supervision result in different game equilibrium outcomes,the code of conduct is only meaningful in the case of moderate supervision. At this point,the code of conduct can highlight the significance of accumulation point in produc-tion of food with good quality,aiming at either producing all food with poor quality or producing all food with high quality in the equilibrium strategy of the n-person game.%文章在古诺模型的基础上，以我国食品行业集体失德危机为背景，建立了一个企业同时进行质量和数量博弈的模型，从双寡头情形扩展到N人博弈情形，证明了企业的逐利性将导致行业集体失德。尽管政府监管水平差异将导致不同的博弈均衡结果，但道德规范仅在中度监管情形下有意义，此时针对N人博弈中要么全部生产问题食品、要么全部生产正常食品的均衡策略，道德规范可以突出生产正常食品的聚点意义。