Based on the panel data of 676 Chinese publicly-traded companies in the period of 1997 - 2007 and the qualitative data of the in-depth interviews of CEOs, Chairpersons of boards of trustees, independent trustees, fund managers and government officials, this paper analyzes the factors and mechanisms that influence the decisions of dismissing CEOs in China. At the theoretical level, the new institutional perspective on corporate governance and its method are adopted. With CEO dismissal being viewed as a social-political process, the respective roles of the board of trustees （the chairperson and independent trustees）, the controlling shareholders, the capital market, and the state in the corporate politics of dismissing CEOs are analyzed in depth. A CEO dismissal pattern that is remarkably different from the predictions of the agency theory and the Western experience has been found in the Chinese context： Having the two separate positions of CEO and chairperson of the board of trustees does not significantly affect the impact of its CEO dismissal on a firm＇s performance. Even worse, appointing independent trustees on the board has led to unintended negative outcomes--instead of reinforcing, this has actually weakened the role of the board of trustees in monitoring and disciplining the CEO＇ s executive functions. Further analysis has nevertheless shown that the controlling shareholders have been quite effective in monitoring and disciplining the Chinese CEOs, and that the capital market has also significantly enhanced the sensitivity of CEO dismissals on the performance of their firms, raising the probability of underachieved CEOs to be dismissed when firm performance suffers. These findings suggest that CEO dismissal is not only an economic process subject to the efficiency logic but also a social-political process subject to the power logic. The author argues that the prevalence of the power logic over the efficiency logic in organizations might be the fundamental reason for the impedance of the reform of corporate governance and other organizational and institutional changes in China, making the reform and new system remaining at the superficial level only.%基于1997-2007年676家中国上市公司的面板数据及其 CEO、董事长、独立董事、基金经理和相关政府官员的访谈资料,本文深入分析了中国上市公司CEO强制离职的影响因素及作用机制,揭示出一种与代理理论预测和西方经验不同的中国的CEO解职规律。研究表明,CEO解职不仅仅是一个经济过程,受＂效率逻辑＂的支配,更是一个社会政治过程,受＂权力逻辑＂的强烈影响。组织中普遍存在的＂权力逻辑＂压倒＂效率逻辑＂的现象可能是阻碍中国公司治理改革和其他组织和制度变迁的深层原因,从而使改革流于形式,新制度止于表象。
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