结合资源依赖理论与代理理论,基于系统GMM估计方法,以2008～2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证研究了连锁董事网络对企业创新投入的影响,并分析了组织冗余作为企业内部资源存量对这种影响的调节作用,以及在不同产权性质下这种调节作用的差异.研究发现:不同的连锁董事网络位置对企业创新投入的作用存在差异,网络中心度对企业创新投入具有负向抑制作用,结构洞指数对企业创新投入则具有正向促进作用;在连锁董事网络中,网络中心度对企业创新投入的抑制作用会受到组织冗余程度的负向调节,结构洞指数对企业创新投入的促进作用则会受到组织冗余程度的正向调节;较之于非国有企业,国有企业的组织冗余程度对网络中心度与企业创新投入负向关系的增强调节作用更强,对结构洞指数与企业创新投入正向关系的增强调节作用则更弱.%This study proposes an integration of the perspectives of resource dependence theory and agency theory to explore the relationship between interlocking directorate network and innovation investment.Based on System GMM estimation method and by using the A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during the period 2008～2015 as research samples,this study empirically investigates the impact of interlocking directorate network on enterprise innovation,the moderating effect of organization slack,as well as the differences of the moderating effects between different nature of property right.It was found that the network centrality positively correlates with R&D investment,while the structural hole has a positive promotion effect on innovation;organizational slack plays a significant moderating role on the relationship between positions of interlocking directorate network and innovation,and the moderating effects differ in the companies with different nature property rights,more specifically,organizational slack negatively moderates the effect of the network centrality on R&D investment but has positive role in the relations between the structural holes and R&D investment;the moderating effect of organizational slack on the relations between network centrality and innovation investment is stronger in the state-owned enterprises,and the moderating effect of organizational slack on the relationship between structural holes and innovation investment is stronger in the non-state-owned enterprises.
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