针对由一个在位制造商、一个进入制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,考虑两个制造商分别生产一种品牌差异化的替代产品,通过零售商销往同一市场;分别构建市场入侵前的基准模型,以及市场入侵下分别由制造商和零售商主导的权力结构模型,并得到唯一均衡解.研究表明:在市场入侵前,不同权力结构下的供应链系统利润相等,且处于主导地位的供应链成员能够获得更多的利润;进入制造商市场入侵不一定会加剧价格竞争,各个制造商与零售商不平衡的权力结构会对各个制造商和供应链系统利润产生影响;在位制造商市场优势有利于缓解两种产品的价格竞争,使得二者的批发价格和销售价格更高,造成供应链系统利润损失.%Given a supply chain consisting of an incumbent manufacturer, an entrant manufacturer and a retailer, the retailer is supplied by two manufacturers with differentiated brands (a good brand and an average brand). According to the power structure differences, and considering the brand differentiation, four types of models are constructed in this study, which include the benchmark models and two Stackelberg game models by the manufacturers and retailer respectively. The results show that, before the entrant manufacturer enters the market, the imbalanced power between the incumbent manufacturer and the retailer plays no role on the optimal pricing or the profits of the whole supply chain. Faced with the entrant's entry, the power structures will influence the two manufactures' profit because it may soften the price competition. The incumbent manufacturer' power advantage leads to higher optimal wholesale price as well as a higher retail price. This implies that the incumbent manufacturer's unfair advantage decreases the profit of whole supply chain.
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