对同步流密码设备的相关性功耗分析(CPA)攻击

摘要

This paper presents a novel correlation power analysis ( CPA) against synchronous stream ciphers by taking advantage of their resychronization weaknesses. It uses the statistics correlation coefficient to analyze ciphers. Furthermore, this paper generalizes the technique of CPA, and presents the procedures and experiments of CPA attacks on synchronous stream ciphers A5/1 and E0. The experimental results indicate that CPA attack against synchronous stream cipher devices is feasible. Moreover,this paper suggests the countermeasures that thwart this attack.%利用同步流密码的再同步弱点,提出了用相关性功耗分析(CPA)攻击同步流密码的技术,该技术采用统计学中的相关系数来分析密钥并实施攻击.概括了CPA技术的攻击过程,给出了CPA攻击两个同步流密码A5/1和E0的步骤和实验.实验证明,用CPA攻击同步流密码是可行的.最后给出了有效的防御对策来抵抗这种攻击.