基于成本最小化的矿产督察博弈分析

摘要

The research purpose is to explore the mechanism of interactions between mining enterprises and mineral supervisors.This paper builds a dynamic evolutionary game model based on the principle of cost minimization.The results show that the strategies of mining enterprises and mineral supervisors depend on four factors:the marginal cost of mining enterprises' law observance (a),the punishments of illegal mining (α),the marginal cost of supervision (b),and the incentives from supervision (β),which interact with each other and made a difference.The paper concludes that ① the key factors that impact on mining enterprises and mineral supervisors are α and β,but a and b is the crucial factor for a long-term effective way to raising the probability of mining enterprises' keeping the law;② the increase of incentives can apparently enhance the supervision of mining,and cause the occurrence of mineral supervisors' false performance,corruption and ineffective supervision as well;③ mining enterprises are more adept at catching and taking use of the information of mineral supervisors to adjust their strategies.%为了探究矿山企业与矿产督察员之间相互作用的内在机理.本文基于成本最小化原则,构建动态演化博弈模型.研究结果表明,双方多阶段的博弈均衡策略,是由矿山企业守法的边际成本(a)、对矿山企业的惩罚措施(α)、矿产督察员监督的边际成本(b)以及对矿产督察员的激励(β)四种因素共同作用的结果.研究结论:①对矿山企业的惩罚和对矿产督察员的激励,是决定矿产督察员的监督强度和矿山企业依法开采水平的关键,而减小矿产督察员监督和矿山企业守法的边际成本,则是提高矿山企业依法开采水平的治本之策;②提高矿产督察员的激励程度,能够提高矿山企业的监督强度,但同时也可能导致矿产督察员谎报业绩、收取贿赂以及无效监督等状况;③对矿山企业监督的强度并不能决定矿山企业是否守法,矿山企业更善于捕捉矿产督察员的信息,并相应调整依法开采水平.