首页> 中文期刊> 《电力系统自动化 》 >基于Stackelberg博弈模型的综合能源系统均衡交互策略

基于Stackelberg博弈模型的综合能源系统均衡交互策略

             

摘要

An analytical model of multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game between the distributed energy station(DES) and the end user(EU)is proposed in order to explore the interactions between the two parties.The hierarchical Stackelberg game model considers the benefits of both DES and EU,and enables EU to make demand responses to maximize their welfare. In this model,the DES leads the game by independently deciding the amount of natural gas input for the generation of both the electricity and heating energies and jointly setting the energy prices to maximize their own profits.The EUs play as followers and determine the electricity and heating energy demands based on the prices the DES announced.Moreover,the closed-form expression of the Stachkelberg equilibrium(SE)of the game between DES and EU is derived.Furthermore,a distributed algorithm is proposed to obtain the SE of this game with limited information.Numerical studies demonstrate the validity of the proposed game scheme as well as the efficiency of the distributed algorithm.%提出了一个基于多主多从Stackelberg博弈的能源交易模型,通过分析综合能源系统中多个分布式能源站和用户之间的多种能源的交互方式,求解它们之间的均衡交互策略.在博弈模型中,分布式能源站作为领导者负责购入天然气来生产用户所需的电能和热能,通过竞争决定能源价格,并且根据用户需求优化生产方式,从而最大化各自的收益.能源用户作为跟随者,以最大化消费者剩余为目标,根据能源价格决定电需求和热需求.通过分析博弈的性质,证明了该博弈模型存在唯一的均衡解,并推导出了该均衡解的闭式表达式.同时,提出了一个分布式算法,仅使用有限的信息求解出能源交易双方的均衡解.经算例验证,所提的博弈方法和分布式算法可有效地求解出分布式能源站和用户的均衡交互策略.

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