首页> 中文期刊> 《江西农业学报》 >循环农业运行中政府行为研究——基于政府、企业和农户的三方博弈分析

循环农业运行中政府行为研究——基于政府、企业和农户的三方博弈分析

         

摘要

The effect of government behaviors on modern tobacco circular agriculture was studied through three - party static games model by taking tobacco as the cut - in point in this paper. The results showed that the attitude of fanner and enterprise participation in modern tobacco circular agriculture was restricted to government fines and subsidies. Government should participate in modern tobacco circular agriculture to internalize the externality of this field. This authors of this article believed that policies of incentives and subsidies were better than tax and direct control. Furthermore, concentrative subsidy was superior to individual subsidy. Government should lead to the establishment of insurance system and provide authentication and information support based on the characteristics of agricultural non - point source pollution.%以烟草这一特殊农产品为切入点,运用三方静态博弈模型,探讨了政府行为对现代烟草循环农业运行的影响.博弈结果显示,农户和企业参与现代烟草循环农业的意愿受政府罚款和补贴的制约,因此,政府应参与现代烟草循环农业以内化其外部性.基于农业面源污染的特性,激励和补贴方式优于税收和直接管制,集中补贴优于个别补贴,且政府应引导建立提供保险供给的制度,并提供认证和信息资助.

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