Based on the fixed assets and long-term equity investment portfolio selection as the research object, this paper analyzes the effect of large shareholders' self-interest motive on the capital allocation decisions from the perspective of private benefits of control. This paper also has carried on the corresponding numerical simulation. The study shows that: (1) There is a negative correlation between investment in fixed assets and long-term equity investment with high-income status, while the long-term equity investment is related to the high probability of state revenue; (2) Large shareholders' capital allocation decisions driven by selfish motive deviate from the levels of capital allocation with dispersed ownership, and the deviation degree show a nonlinear variation trend with the increasing of separation of cash flow rights and control rights. The results of this study provide implications for the policy-making on enhancing the large shareholders' financial decision-making regulation.%本文以长期股权投资和固定资产的投资组合选择为研究对象，从控制权私利的视角探讨了大股东自利性动机对资本配置决策的作用机理，并进行了相应的数值模拟。研究发现：（1）固定资产投资规模与长期股权投资高状态收益存在负相关关系，而长期股权投资规模则与其高状态收益概率正相关；（2）大股东自利性动机驱使下的资本配置决策偏离了分散持股时的资本配置水平，偏离程度会随着现金流权与控制权分离度的增加而展现出非线性变化态势。上述研究结论为当前有关加强上市公司大股东财务决策监管的政策导向提供了重要的经验启示。
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