Real appearances: The metaphysics and epistemology of direct realism

摘要

This project distinguishes competing direct realist theories of perception and defends one version called the real appearances theory. For indirect realists, conscious perceptual experience is constituted by direct acquaintance with internal sensory entities. Minimal direct realists deny this claim, but suggest competing accounts of perceptual experience. One issue that divides direct realists concerns the mediation of perception. Compositional direct realists say that veridical perception is partially constituted by internal psychological states (usually representational states) that do not include as constituents physical objects or any aspect of them. Relational direct realists say that veridical perceptual experience is an irreducible psychological relation that includes as constituents physical objects or some aspect of them. A second issue that divides direct realists concerns whether there are common factors in that veridical and hallucinatory perceptual experiences. Common factor direct realists say that all perceptual experiences are partially constituted by intrinsically similar entities while non-common factor direct realists deny this. Four broad direct realist theories may be generated by combining the responses to each of the two issues.;The real appearances theory combines relational and common factor direct realism. Consequently, in contrast to both compositional and non-common factor theories, it is forced to face directly the traditional arguments against direct realism. Perceptual experience is direct acquaintance with sensible quality instances, which characterize physical objects in veridical perception but which constitute mind-dependent visual objects in hallucination. Proximate neural states causally sufficient for hallucinatory experience are insufficient for veridical perceptual experience; instead, a causal process going from the perceived object to a neural state is causally necessary and sufficient for veridical perception. The argument from secondary qualities fails to overturn the possibility that sensible colors are causally inert but nonetheless are objects of direct acquaintance. The time-gap argument requires for its success the premise that an object must be temporally simultaneous with our acquaintance with it, which plausibly can be denied. Finally, all purported sensory illusions must be explained either as situations in which cognition accounts for apparent illusoriness, or as abnormal veridical perceptual experiences, or as ordinary but pervasive hallucinations.