Hobbesian public reason.

摘要

One of the major problems in liberalism is the justification of political authority to groups with pluralistic views. In the face of intransigent pluralism, liberal theorists have sought to construct a 'public reason' that everyone can accept (actually or hypothetically), a public reason which vindicates the coercive actions of the state. Thomas Hobbes was arguably the first normative theorist to confront radical pluralism and to foresee a solution in terms of a doctrine of public reason. I contend that Hobbes provides an account of public reason that successfully responds to the deep problem of pluralism and that his account significantly anticipates contemporary accounts. It might seem that Hobbes is an unlikely contender in the public reason debates, and he has so been ignored. But this is a mistake. Hobbesian political philosophy, correctly understood, is more viable than contemporary philosophers acknowledge.;This dissertation is a reinterpretation of Hobbes's political theory that highlights the problems associated with pluralism and identifies a Hobbesian conception of public reason. Conflict, according to this interpretation, is brought about by a difference in opinion, a lack of right reason and the subjectivity of value. In order to avert conflict, individuals form an agreement (the social contract) which provides a procedural resolution to dangerous pluralism. This procedure is, as articulated by Hobbes, an absolute sovereign, whose judgment/will becomes the public standard by which the citizens adjudicate conflict. This standard, however, is not a mere modus vivendi. The sovereign provides Razian content-independent reasons for action. These are authoritatively-based reasons that all citizens must accept despite their pluralism.;Hobbesian accounts of public reason (provided by David Gauthier and Michael Ridge) have attempted to soften Hobbes's absolutism. They realize that there is a tension that is presented for any theorist that toes the Hobbesian line. This tension has been referred to as the "Hobbesian Dilemma." On one horn, we are afraid that we might create a monster with our authorization of an absolute sovereign. On the other horn, we are afraid that if we do not hand over unlimited power to the sovereign (and to its judgment) we will not be freed from the conflict that is endemic to our reliance upon private pluralistic standards. Modern Hobbesians, stressing the first horn, are afraid of authorizing a supreme political entity, so they provide modifications that serve to restrict such an entity. These modifications, however, necessarily reintroduce pluralism back into the commonwealth. But if we take Hobbes seriously and accept that pluralism generates a state of war, the reintroduction of pluralism must be viewed as disastrous.;This project shows that a strong defense of Hobbesian public reason can be advanced by providing a reinterpretation of Hobbes's arguments for absolute sovereignty. I argue that Hobbes advocates "thin absolutism"; a system of authority that merely ensures respect of the core concepts of sovereignty---hierarchy and normative closure. This new interpretation of Hobbes's absolutism shows that the concerns regarding sovereign tyranny are not fatal to his procedural account of public reason. With thin absolutism, the sovereign is neither necessarily ineffective nor inherently dangerous. This then, leaves Hobbesian absolutism and ultimately Hobbesian public reason, in the position of being a "reasonable contender"---a system of political authority that might require our allegiance, but at the very least requires serious attention.