Fear of heights: Foreign policy decision-making in the Israeli-Syrian conflict, 1988--2001.

摘要

This dissertation investigates why leaders choose certain negotiating strategies when seeking peace with adversaries. In particular, this study examines whether a leader's beliefs are more determinative than a range of domestic and/or international factors in explaining their political behaviour. In order to accomplish this objective, this dissertation analyzes the beliefs of five Israeli prime ministers involved in peace talks with Syria during the period 1988-2001: Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Binyamin Netanyhau, and Ehud Barak.;The analysis refutes the main alternative explanations that leaders were influenced by public opinion, coalitional dynamics, party affiliation and/or pressure from the United States, in their selection of a land-for-peace or peace-for-peace negotiating strategy. Rather, this study argues that Israeli prime ministers had the capacity to affect political outcomes. No other combination of reasons provides a sufficient explanation for their behaviour and one cannot obtain a fully satisfactory account of Israeli foreign policy by focusing exclusively on domestic and/or international factors. Although domestic and/or international factors played a role in influencing a prime minister's actions, a leader's personality was a necessary component of any outcome.;Specifically, the study focuses on whether the leaders valued the Golan Heights in instrumental and/or intrinsic terms and whether the prime ministers believed that Syria had the capacity to modify its behaviour towards Israel. An examination of the case studies suggests that leaders who valued the Golan Heights in purely instrumental terms were more likely to choose a land-for-peace strategy in peace negotiations with enemies than leaders who viewed the territory both in instrumental and intrinsic terms. Moreover, leaders who believed that an adversary had the ability to change were more likely to choose a land-for-peace strategy in peace negotiations with enemies than leaders who perceived opponents in static terms. The dissertation also reveals that the more restrictive the conditions attached to potential concessions, the more strongly the leader valued the Golan Heights in instrumental terms.