Cicero's 'Academica' and the Foundation of a Roman Academy.

摘要

The dissertation conducts a close philological and philosophical reading of Cicero's Academica, the earliest extant treatise of his late series of philosophical dialogues, arguing that this fragmentary work is more than simply a summary in translation of Greek philosophy, but is an original and complex intellectual project in its own right. My interpretation explores how Cicero's treatment of epistemological controversies is a radical response to the momentous personal, political and cultural changes he was living through, as well as an original contribution to the skeptical current that had developed within Plato's Academy since the third century BCE. I contend that Cicero, through the screen of a dispute between rival interpretations of Academic epistemology, is exploring philosophy's potential to act as a platform for political activity, while also articulating an original expression of Academic skepticism and legitimizing his voice as heir to the Athenian Academy.;The argument develops over three parts. In the first, through close textual analysis I evaluate the relationship between the letters in which Cicero discusses revising the Academica and the content of the Academica itself. Part I argues two points: firstly, that the letters express how, in Cicero's view, philosophy interacts with, and influences real life; secondly, that the letters fashion a social network which constitutes the space for philosophical engagement. The political and social nature of this intellectual enterprise is signaled from the outset through the constant demand that Cicero makes of his correspondents to both collaborate in the revision of his work and to respond to its claims.;Part II explores how Cicero's historiographical approach to philosophy is an original way to shape a sense of community rooted in philosophical tradition and reason. Through a comparative analysis with other historians of philosophy, especially in the Idealist tradition from Kant to Gentile through Hegel, I claim that Cicero is not simply chronicling the transformations of the period, but that he is in fact harnessing and manipulating that narrative of change with a view to asserting both his own role within it, and its significance for Rome's historical circumstances. The Athenian Academy is adopted and adapted for a Roman audience, and the very notion of school as institution is radically re-thought by Cicero to fill the vacuum left in the wake of Athens' and Rome's collapse. From this innovative historiographical perspective, I aim to show that evaluating Cicero's historical method in the Academica offers a privileged perspective onto both his skepticism and his role as observer of, and participant in such a critical juncture of the West's political and philosophical history.;In the final part, I discuss the Academica as a programmatic statement of Ciceronian skepticism. The author, I contend, develops an extreme form of philosophical skepticism which he enacts through a sustained criticism of all the ideas presented in the fragments, including his own. Cicero introduces his position not as a set of theories, but as a hermeneutic practice and an approach to philosophizing which the reader is made to experience throughout his text. The treatise is an original attempt to teach skepticism in written form, avoiding the dogmatic implications of the written word. Cicero's rhetorical treatment of skepticism makes two further claims for this form of philosophizing. Because of its critical and dialogic nature, skepticism emerges as a strategic vantage-point from which to appropriate the whole spectrum of philosophy, while also emphasizing the individual's key role in its practice.