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Price-driven charging of plug-in electric vehicles in the smart grid.

机译:智能电网中插电式电动汽车的价格驱动充电。

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摘要

As the number of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) increases, it is essential to control their charging schedules and spread the PEV load over time to reduce the energy generation and distribution costs due to this additional demand. Furthermore, due to the limited power capacity of the transmission feeders and the sensitivity of the mid-way distribution transformers to excessive load, it is crucial to control the amount of power through each specific feeder in the distribution network to avoid system overloads that may lead to breakdowns. In this thesis we develop, analyze and evaluate price-driven charging algorithms for PEVs in a smart grid environment. The algorithms we propose minimize the cost incurred on the power distribution system (or the supply cost of the electric utility or aggregator) due to the PEV load, and at the same time prevents overloading of the transmission feeders.;We first develop two convex optimization algorithms for PEV charging that minimize the aggregator's convex cost function subject to transmission feeder overload constraints. The two algorithms are amenable to decentralized implementation, in which the PEVs react to the load signals on their supply paths and the distribution grid on the whole (by adjusting their charging schedules).;We next analyze the equilibrium properties of a natural price-driven charging control game in the distribution grid, between the utility (that sets the time-dependent energy usage price) and selfish PEVs (that choose their own charging schedules to minimize individual cost). We demonstrate, through analysis and simulations, that individual best-response strategies converge to socially optimal charging profiles (also equilibrium solutions) under fairly weak assumptions about the (asynchronous) charging profile update processes. We also discuss how the framework can be extended to consider the topology of the distribution tree and associated transmission feeder capacity constraints.;We then consider the day-ahead price-setting question from the perspective of the utility (or aggregator) that is interested in minimizing the average energy supply costs given the uncertainty in the charging preferences of the PEV owners. Modeling the uncertainty in the PEV charging constraints in a Bayesian framework, we propose a day-ahead pricing policy that can minimize the overall energy supply cost in expectation, subject to transmission feeder capacity constraints. The same pricing policy can be extended to maximize economic surplus, computed as the total valuation of the energy provided to all PEVs minus the total energy supply cost. A simple extension of our approach to real-time pricing of PEV demand is also discussed, and evaluated through simulations.
机译:随着插电式电动汽车(PEV)数量的增加,至关重要的是控制其充电时间表并随着时间的推移分散PEV的负荷,以减少由于这种额外需求而产生的能源和配电成本。此外,由于输电馈线的功率容量有限以及中途配电变压器对超负荷的敏感度,至关重要的是控制通过配电网络中每个特定馈线的电量,以避免可能导致系统过载的系统过载。故障。在本文中,我们开发,分析和评估了智能电网环境中电动汽车的价格驱动的充电算法。我们提出的算法可将由于PEV负载而导致配电系统的成本(或电力公司或聚合器的供应成本)降至最低,并同时防止了输电线路的过载。用于PEV充电的算法,可在传输馈线过载限制的情况下最小化聚合器的凸成本函数。这两种算法都适合分散实施,在这种算法中,PEV对它们的供应路径和整个配电网的负载信号做出反应(通过调整其充电时间表)。;接下来,我们分析自然价格驱动的均衡特性。配电网中的充电控制游戏,在公用事业公司(设置时间相关的能源使用价格)和自私的私家车(选择自己的充电时间表以最小化单个成本)之间。通过分析和模拟,我们证明了在(异步)计费配置文件更新过程的相当弱的假设下,各个最佳响应策略都收敛到了社会最优的计费配置文件(也是均衡解决方案)。我们还讨论了如何扩展该框架以考虑配电树的拓扑结构和相关的输电线路容量约束。然后,我们从对公用事业(或聚合商)感兴趣的角度考虑日前定价问题。考虑到PEV车主充电偏好的不确定性,将平均能源供应成本降至最低。在贝叶斯框架中对PEV充电约束的不确定性进行建模,我们提出了一种日前定价策略,该策略可以将预期的总能源供应成本降至最低,并受输电线路容量约束。可以扩展相同的定价政策,以最大程度地提高经济盈余,计算方法是,提供给所有PEV的能源总价值减去总能源供应成本。还讨论了我们对PEV需求的实时定价方法的简单扩展,并通过仿真进行了评估。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ghavami Pakdehi, Abouzar.;

  • 作者单位

    Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.;

  • 授予单位 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.;
  • 学科 Engineering Electronics and Electrical.;Economics Environmental.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2014
  • 页码 118 p.
  • 总页数 118
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:53:59

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