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The Will to Truth and the Will to Believe: Friedrich Nietzsche and William James Against Scientism

机译:真相与信仰:弗里德里希·尼采和威廉·詹姆斯反对科学主义

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摘要

My dissertation brings into conversation two thinkers who are seldom considered together and highlights previously unnoticed similarities in their critical responses to scientism, which was just as prevalent in the late nineteenth century as it is today. I analyze this attitude as consisting of two linked propositions. The first, which Nietzsche calls "the unconditional will to truth," is that the aims of science, discovering truth and avoiding error, are the most important human aims; and the second is that no practice other than science can achieve them. Both Nietzsche and James criticize the unconditional will to truth for privileging a transcendent ideal over the demands of human life. This unconditional will regards truth as valuable in itself and demands that we pursue it under all circumstances---even if that demand comes into conflict with other values. I lay out the ways in which Nietzsche and James view the value of truth and the imperative to pursue it as conditional on its promotion of human flourishing. In response to the second proposition of scientism, both philosophers argue that science can neither tell us what we should value, nor fully account for the value we in fact find in certain objects, activities, and experiences. And crucially, science cannot tell us whether or why its own goal of attaining truth is valuable. Nietzsche and James reach different conclusions about what is ultimately valuable, and whether traditional religious belief is defensible in light of the discoveries of science. Nonetheless, the hitherto unappreciated similarities I have uncovered in their arguments show that principled opposition to scientism need not be associated with any particular moral or religious viewpoint. This analysis is not only of historical interest: those who consider scientism to be ill-founded and intellectually confining can take some cues from our nineteenth-century predecessors' strategies for combating it.
机译:在我的论文中,两位很少被思考的思想家进行了交谈,并强调了他们对科学主义的批判性反应中以前未曾注意到的相似之处,这一点在十九世纪末期与今天一样普遍。我将这种态度分析为由两个相关的命题组成。尼采称之为“对真理的无条件的意志”,其第一是科学的目标,发现真理和避免错误是人类最重要的目标。其次,除了科学以外,没有其他方法可以实现这些目标。尼采和詹姆斯都批评无条件地追求真理,因为他超越了人类的生活需求而超越了理想。这种无条件的将视真理本身为宝贵,并要求我们在任何情况下都追求真理-即使该要求与其他价值观发生冲突。我提出了尼采和詹姆斯认为真理的价值的方式,以及追求真理必须以促进人类繁荣为前提的方式。响应科学主义的第二个命题,两位哲学家都认为科学既不能告诉我们我们应该重视什么,也不能完全说明我们实际上在某些对象,活动和经验中发现的价值。而且至关重要的是,科学无法告诉我们其实现真理的目标是否有价值或为什么有价值。尼采和詹姆斯就什么才是最有价值的,以及根据科学发现是否可以辩护传统宗教信仰得出了不同的结论。但是,我在他们的论点中迄今未发现的相似之处表明,对科学主义的原则性反对不必与任何特定的道德或宗教观点联系在一起。这种分析不仅具有历史意义:那些认为科学主义基础不足并且在思想上受到限制的人可以从我们19世纪前辈与之抗衡的战略中获得一些线索。

著录项

  • 作者

    Cristy, Rachel.;

  • 作者单位

    Princeton University.;

  • 授予单位 Princeton University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy of science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2018
  • 页码 190 p.
  • 总页数 190
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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