The psychological study of decision-making has been driven by consequentialist models. In this work, I propose a novel decision-making theory, the action-hesitancy model, aimed at articulating a non-consequentialist alternative to these models. I argue that this theory is capable of addressing a broad class of decision-making phenomena, including some (such as Milgram's experiments) that have so far been neglected by decision-making literature. According to this model, people strive to make obvious decisions and act without hesitation. When hesitant, they seek new information in order to transform the appraisal of their situation in such a way as to make the course of action obvious. Based on this model, I propose a new experimental paradigm for testing its predictions. In this paradigm, a perception of obviousness of a given choice is manipulated by introduction of irrelevant alternatives into the choice set. Changes in this perception, in turn, affect the stated probability of acting on one's decision and willingness to change one's choice in directions consistent with predictions of the action-hesitancy model.
展开▼
