Values and normativity: A study of the metaethical foundations of prescriptive ethics

摘要

Moral nihilism, the view that "nothing matters," denies the possibility of identifying an objective source of normativity because it denies the existence of moral facts or truths. Since ethics purports to guide proper human actions, the truth of nihilism would undermine this crucial function. Cognitivists, those who believe that moral facts and truths exist and humans have the capacity to recognize them and act accordingly, are united by their eschewal of nihilism but are divided as to how to justify this position. Rationalism and Naturalism are two broad metaethical views competing for this prestige. Prominent philosopher, Derek Parfit, argues in his treatise, On What Matters, that Rationalism is the only viable foundation to support Cognitivism. Rationalism holds that fundamental normative truths are irreducibly normative. This view, in other words, declares that there is deep cleavage between normative truths and natural truths---truths about what should be and truths about what is. Rationalism purports to be an objective metaethical foundation for devising a robust normative theory, but several irredeemable flaws are revealed upon closer inspection. Rationalism depends on a defective conception of objectivity because it implausibly insists in the existence of intrinsically valuable goods and corresponding intuitive abilities for their recognition. Contra Rationalism, intrinsic values and intuitive abilities are invariably subjective criteria and ipso facto cannot support Cognitivism. These failings do not apply to Naturalism, despite criticisms to the contrary. According to Naturalism, the concept of a value is not an irreducible primary; it presupposes a beneficiary that stands to gain or lose in relation to its obtainment. Values, in other words, presuppose an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? Since life forms are the only class of entities whose existence is conditional upon the successful and recurring obtainment of values, life is the progenitor of values and source of normativity. This paper is predominantly concerned with refuting Rationalism as advocated by Derek Parfit and exhibiting the defense of my metaethical position I call Metaphysical Naturalist Cognitivism, which essentially claims that life is the one and only objective standard of normativity.