ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AGENCY THEORY: A FIELD SETTING EXAMPLE.

摘要

Organizational control is treated in a variety of ways in the organizational behavior literature. It is also an important topic in the accounting literature. Despite the diversity of these literatures, the central problem of organizational control remains: how can organizations be managed such that cooperation among individuals with diverse preferences is obtained?;The research site is fifty-four specialty retail stores. The research focuses on the control practices for the sales staff. The major instrument is a questionnaire which is answered by the store managers. Secondary informants and sources are also used.;The principal findings are that increased use of input-based contracts is related to (1) increasing labor service observability as measured by increasing task programmability and increasing direct supervision, (2) increasing outcome uncertainty as measured by increasing failure rates and competition by line of merchandise, (3) increasing cost of outcome observation as measured by the size of the store chain, and (4) more recent founding date for the organization.;A promising perspective, agency theory, is being developed in the theoretical economics/accounting literature. Agency theory is promising because it offers a comprehensive approach to control which includes risk and uncertainty, costs of information, and observability of behaviors and outcomes. However, agency theory has received no field testing. Thus, the purpose of this research is to improve understanding of organizational control through the operationalization of agency theory in a field setting.