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TALK OUT OR WALK OUT: THE ROLE AND CONTROL OF CONFLICT IN A KENTUCKY COAL MINE.

机译:脱口而出:在肯塔基州煤矿中冲突的作用和控制。

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摘要

This thesis examines the questions of the role and control of industrial conflict within the context of a bitter labor-management conflict and third party intervention in a Kentucky coal mine in 1976-1980.;As it turned out, the closest functional alternative to the strike was not formal grievance processing, but rather informal problem-solving. This may explain Brett and Goldberg's discovered correlation between high strike frequency in Appalachian coal mines and the lack of a "problem-solving relationship" (1979: 465-483).;The subsequent reduction in strikes represented a reduction in overt and perceived conflict, but not in the underlying structural conflict of interest. The strikes reflected a changing relationship between labor and manaement in the U.S. coal industry in the late 1970s, and as such would tend to recur as external factors upset the local power balance.;The third parties played the role of neither a classical mediator nor a typical organizational development consultant, but rather a system-designer who institutionalized problem-solving activity. At variance with the conventional image of the third party as neutral facilitator, the third parties used their power to legitimize, solidify, and protect certain newly won powers of the rank and file. Conditions for the institutionalization included the intervention of an outside third party, a prior destructive trauma, and concomitant changes in the labor-management power relationship.;The wildcat strikes at this mine came about as each side contested, learned about, and adjusted to a certain power relationship at the local level. Contrary to institutionalist views of industrial relations, the wildcat strikes were neither anomalous nor wholly destructive. Rather they served to restore the implicit contract as perceived by the miners, to give the miners a sense of control over their problems, and to gain them power in certain domains over management. Moreover, as an alternative costly to each side, the strikes encouraged the parties to take seriously the grievance procedure and joint problem-solving activity.
机译:本文探讨了在1976年至1980年发生的激烈的劳资纠纷和第三方干预肯塔基煤矿的情况下,工业冲突的作用和控制的问题。事实证明,罢工是最接近职能的替代方案不是正式的申诉处理,而是非正式的问题解决。这也许可以解释布雷特和戈德堡发现的阿巴拉契亚煤矿罢工频率高与缺乏“问题解决关系”之间的相关性(1979:465-483)。;罢工的减少意味着公开和可感知的冲突减少,但不存在潜在的结构性利益冲突。罢工反映了1970年代末期美国煤炭行业劳资关系的变化,并且由于外部因素扰乱了地方权力平衡,这种趋势往往会再次发生。第三方既没有扮演古典调解者的角色,也没有扮演过调解人的角色。典型的组织发展顾问,而是将问题解决活动制度化的系统设计师。与第三方作为中立促进者的传统形象有所不同,第三方使用其权力来合法化,巩固和保护某些新获得的官僚力量。制度化的条件包括外部第三方的干预,先前的破坏性创伤以及劳动管理权力关系的随之变化。随着双方的竞争,了解和适应,双方对该矿的野蛮罢工发生了在地方一级有一定的权力关系。与制度主义的劳资关系观点相反,野蛮的罢工​​既不是异常也不是完全破坏性的。相反,他们起着恢复矿工所感知的隐性合同的作用,使矿工对问题有控制感,并在某些领域获得管理权。此外,作为对双方而言代价高昂的替代选择,罢工鼓励双方认真对待申诉程序和联合解决问题的活动。

著录项

  • 作者

    URY, WILLIAM LANGER.;

  • 作者单位

    Harvard University.;

  • 授予单位 Harvard University.;
  • 学科 Anthropology Cultural.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1982
  • 页码 348 p.
  • 总页数 348
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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