DIVINE PARTICIPATION AND ESCHATOLOGY IN THE THEODICIES OF PAUL TILLICH AND JUERGEN MOLTMANN.

摘要

This dissertation examines the use of the idea of divine participation in and conquest of the negative, and the function of eschatology, in the theodicies of Paul Tillich and Jurgen Moltmann. It is argued that Tillich's and Moltmann's response to the question of theodicy can be described as "hermeneutical"--a reflection on the symbols of the Christian faith--in contrast to a critical philosophy which rejects theism or a metaphysical theology which does theodicy in a more traditional sense of a rational justification for the presence of evil in a world created by a good God. To answer the theodicy question, both thinkers use the idea of divine participation in and conquest of the negative in two ways: speculatively, by reflecting on the idea of God as a dialectical process in which the negative is included and transformed; and hermeneutically, by reflecting on christological and eschatological symbols which offer existential responses to the problem of unjust suffering.; Because both Tillich and Moltmann answer the theodicy question with some form of eschatological panentheism, the main question raised in the comparison and contrast of their use of the idea of divine participation and conquest is: If their theodicies are similar, and if their eschatologies are different, how are we to assess this difference? It is concluded that although Moltmann's future-oriented eschatology is often interpreted as more "dynamic" or political than Tillich's present-oriented eschatology, Tillich's eschatology is dynamic and centered in the dialectics of life.; Throughout this comparative study of Tillich's and Moltmann's theodicies, three critical questions are raised: (1) How can we know that God participated in and conquered the negative in the Christ event? (2) Is the theodicy question "open" as Tillich and Moltmann maintain, or is eschatological panentheism guaranteed? (3) If God does participate in and conquer the negative, is God any less morally responsible for the presence of the negative in the world? It is concluded that Tillich and Moltmann do not offer "answers" to these questions (in the style of a rational theodicy), but "responses" that can be helpful in one's approach to the existential problem of theodicy.