Motivation, objectivity, and basic goods in John Finnis's natural law theory.

摘要

John Finnis defends a controversial natural law theory that purports to offset difficulties he takes to beset a classical tradition of natural law theorizing. He defends his theory in two ways. First, Finnis tries to strengthen the case for his theory by criticizing contending moral theories, including this classical natural law doctrine. Second, he develops his own positive views, thereby attempting to overcome what he regards as the weaknesses of these contending views. This dissertation develops criticisms of both these strategies.; Part one of the dissertation first summarizes major aspects of Finnis's axiology and deontology and locates the views of Finnis and Finnis's Suarez in the context of the contemporary internalism-externalism debate. Then, part one goes on to criticize Finnis's use of a Humean criticism to defeat Suarez. It does so by drawing on Frankena's response to Nowell-Smith's internalist criticism of an externalist intuitionist view. Finally, part one responds to Finnis's criticism of the way some contending views analyze concrete instances of human action. Also, it responds to Finnis's use of a thought-experiment involving an "experience machine" to defeat contending views.; Part two of the dissertation criticizes two aspects of Finnis's axiology. One aspect is this theory's internalist account of motivation. It reconstructs a way Finnis would defend this aspect of his theory against various "amoralism objections" and shows that this response encounters difficulties. Another aspect of Finnis's theory is its commitment to the objectivity of judgments concerning goods. The work of Nowell-Smith proves useful in criticizing this aspect of Finnis's theory. Part two concludes with some tentative remarks on ways a broadly Suarezian view might be able to offset difficulties which beset the Finnis view.