This dissertation explores how antiquity and some of its early modern admirers understand the notion of certainty, especially as it is theorized in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, a first-century educational manual for the aspiring orator that defines certainty in terms of consensus. As part of a larger discussion of argumentative strategies, Quintilian turns to the "nature of all arguments," which he defines as "reasoning which lends credence to what is doubtful by means of what is certain" (ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis adferens: quae natura est omnium argumentorum, V.10.8). These certainties, he later specifies, include not matters of scientific demonstration or objective fact, but the agreements of various communities: the laws of cities, local customs, and other forms of consensus. As the foundation of persuasive rhetoric, these consensus-based certainties situate argumentation as the practice of crafting agreements rather than demonstrating necessary conclusions.;Taking as its point of departure Quintilian's novel understanding of certainty, this study looks to some of Quintilian's intellectual forebears as well as his later readers to show how his work is both a nexus of earlier intellectual developments as well as an important inspiration for later accounts of certainty, even into the early modern period. After illustrating in the first chapters of this dissertation how Quintilian's manual incorporates elements from Aristotelian notions of dialectic and rhetoric as well as from Ciceronian skeptical approaches to epistemology, I show how Quintilian's curriculum for the orator shapes the thought of Italian humanists, especially that of Lorenzo Valla (1406--1457), a reformer of scholastic logic and dialectic, and Giambattista Vico (1668--1744), an influential Neapolitan jurist. Adopting Quintilian's rendering of certainty as a matter of agreements and conventions, these later authors elaborate their own novel approaches to various fields---including law, language, and logic---through this ancient understanding of certum. Contrary to modern notions of certainty as objective or scientific fact, Quintilian's humanist readers continue to root this concept in consensus, both within the courtroom and without.
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机译：本论文探讨了古代及其某些早期现代崇拜者如何理解确定性的概念，特别是在昆蒂利安的《演说家研究所》（Institutio Oratoria）中提出了理论，这是一本面向有抱负的演说家的第一世纪教育手册，它以共识的方式定义了确定性。作为辩论策略更大讨论的一部分，Quintilian转向“所有争论的本质”，他将其定义为“通过确定的事物借以对可疑事物给予信任的推理”（按一定比例得出的证据） adferens：quae natura est omnium argumentsorum，V.10.8）。他后来指出，这些确定性不包括科学论证或客观事实，而是各个社区的协议：城市法律，当地习俗和其他形式的共识。作为有说服力的言论的基础，这些基于共识的确定性将论点视为制定协议的实践，而不是证明必要的结论。；以昆蒂利安对确定性的新颖理解为出发点，本研究也关注昆蒂利安的一些知识先驱。向后来的读者展示他的作品既是早期智力发展的纽带，又是后来确定性的重要灵感，甚至进入了近代早期。在本论文的第一章中阐述了昆提利安的手册如何结合亚里士多德的辩证和修辞学概念以及塞西洛尼亚对认识论的怀疑方法之后，我展示了昆提利安的演说家课程如何塑造意大利人文主义者的思想，尤其是洛伦佐的思想。瓦拉（1406--1457）是学术逻辑和辩证法的改革者，而贾纳巴蒂斯塔·维科（Giambattista Vico）（1668--1744）是那不勒斯有影响力的法学家。这些后来的作者采用Quintilian的确定性作为协议和惯例的问题，通过对古老的对证明的理解，阐述了自己在各个领域（包括法律，语言和逻辑）的新颖方法。与现代的作为客观事实或科学事实的确定性概念相反，昆蒂利安的人文主义读者继续在法庭内外都将这一概念植根于共识。
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