Playing nice: The costs and consequences of China's reassurance strategy in Southeast Asia.

摘要

This study examines China's reassurance strategy in Southeast Asia from 1998-2008. Much of the international relations literature on reassurance argues that an actor must send "costly signals" to another actor for reassurance efforts to be credible and successful. Costly signals require the sender to accept risks and incur costs for the sake of reassuring the receiver. I hypothesize, however, that China has adopted a low-cost reassurance strategy and that this strategy has been sufficient to reassure Southeast Asia that its growing economic and military power do not pose a threat to the region. I test this hypothesis by examining three dimensions of China's reassurance strategy---regional multilateralism, confidence-building measures, and economic reassurance---and three areas in which China could incur costs for carrying out the strategy---politico-diplomatic, economic, and military. The findings support my initial hypothesis and suggest that China's success thus far in building up trust and goodwill in Southeast Asia may rest on a shaky foundation. Analyses that emphasize China's "ascendance" in the region may be overlooking a key vulnerability of its reassurance strategy.