International cooperation and reform of the Japanese financial markets. (Volumes I and II).

摘要

This thesis examined the reasons for international cooperation, using the efforts by the United States to induce reform of the Japanese financial markets as the case study. Systemic theories of international cooperation, particularly hegemonic stability, do not sufficiently take into account the domestic factors that influence the cooperative process. As a result, they tell little about the timing and extent of cooperation.;To compensate for the deficiency, the paper applied Putnam's two level game theory. Putnam's analysis suggests that, in optimizing a negotiation effort, domestic considerations on both sides of the bargaining table should be considered and influenced.;Analysis of the Japanese financial markets demonstrates that the pace of reform largely depended upon domestic considerations. U.S. efforts to induce change worked best when coinciding with the views of important interest groups within Japan. When the agenda shifted to issues of little importance of these groups, progress slowed.;Progress also depended upon a host of domestic considerations within the United States. The Department of Treasury became embroiled in a bureaucratic turf battle over responsibility for financial negotiations. The Department also did not maintain strong relations with the private sector and did not devote the resources or energy needed to negotiate with the Japanese.;The analysis suggested that domestic factors largely explained the progress of the talks and the reform process in Japan. This further suggested that, to maximize results, negotiators on the U.S. side needed of take these factors into greater account. To do so would require substantial changes in the negotiation agenda and expansion of the process to include other agencies, particularly the Office of the United States Trade Representative.