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Democratic experimentation under party dictatorship: A study of China's political reforms, 1979-1989.

机译:政党专政下的民主试验:1979年至1989年的中国政治改革研究。

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摘要

This study focuses upon the institutional aspects of China's democratic reform in the 1980s. It explores why, under Communist one-party rule, Marxist "democratization" could significantly alter the power structure to make real popular influence on government possible. Based on an analysis of the conflict of interests and the complex interaction between the Party leadership, cadres and the subordinate population, this study explains the achievements, limitations and consequences of the democratic reform.; The dissertation reveals a self-promoting logic inherent in Marxist "democratization." The central leadership was compelled to initiate modest political reform under heavy social pressure. By institutionalizing popular sharing of power, this reform aimed to rationalize policy-making mechanisms and supervise the conduct of Party cadres. But resistance from Party organizations and cadres against the reform efforts made the democratic process impossible. In order to enforce reformist policies and solve the legitimacy crisis of the regime, the CCP leaders aligned with the citizens to strip Party cadres of their executive power and reduce their policy-making power. As a result, the power of the legislature at all levels, whose members were elected in a relatively democratic way, was greatly expanded. However, Party leaders' alignment with the citizens was contingent on the latter's political attitudes. Distrustful of popular spontaneity, Party leaders had to allow the cadres to retain substantial power so that mass participation would not go beyond prescribed political and ideological limits. Once social demands arose that Party leaders perceived as politically threatening, they reverted to relying upon Party cadres to reassert party dictatorship. This opportunistic dealignment and realignment on the part of the leadership indicate the fundamental limitation and dilemma of Marxist "democratization."; This study is based on my fieldwork in China and a variety of primary sources. It applies the theory and methodology of comparative politics to the concrete analysis of the Chinese case.
机译:这项研究侧重于1980年代中国民主改革的制度方面。它探讨了为什么在共产党的一党制统治下,马克思主义的“民主化”可以显着改变权力结构,从而使真正的民众对政府的影响成为可能。在分析利益冲突和党的领导,干部与下层人民之间复杂的互动关系的基础上,本研究阐述了民主改革的成就,局限性和后果。论文揭示了马克思主义“民主化”中固有的自我促进逻辑。中央领导人被迫在沉重的社会压力下发起适度的政治改革。这项改革通过使民众的权力共享制度化,旨在合理化决策机制并监督党的干部行为。但是党组织和干部对改革努力的抵制使得民主进程不可能实现。为了执行改良主义政策并解决该政权的合法性危机,中共领导人与公民结盟,剥夺了党的干部的执行权,降低了决策权。结果,以相对民主的方式选出其成员的各级立法机关的权力得到了大大扩展。但是,党的领导人与公民的结盟取决于后者的政治态度。党的领导人不信任民众的自发性,不得不让干部保留强大的权力,这样群众的参与就不会超出规定的政治和意识形态范围。一旦出现社会要求,使党的领导人被视为政治威胁,他们便转而依靠党的干部来重申党的专政。领导者的这种机会主义失调和重新统一表明了马克思主义“民主化”的根本局限和困境。这项研究基于我在中国的实地考察和各种主要资料。它将比较政治学的理论和方法论应用于对中国案例的具体分析。

著录项

  • 作者

    Chen, An.;

  • 作者单位

    Yale University.;

  • 授予单位 Yale University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1993
  • 页码 464 p.
  • 总页数 464
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:50:01

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