Commons problems, collective action and efficiency: The evolution of institutions of co-management in Pacific Northwest tribal fisheries.

摘要

This dissertation is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the evolution of institutions of self-governance in the area of natural resource management. The theoretical emphasis is on problems of collective action and the evolution of rules and practices centered on the resolution of such problems. The empirical focus is on a regulatory regime in which 20 Pacific Northwest Indian tribes co-manage the area's salmon fisheries along with Washington State's Departments of Fisheries and Game and various federal and international regulatory bodies.; The dissertation attempts to answer two interrelated questions: (1) Can user-groups, acting alone or in concert with other regulatory bodies, successfully manage a large, complex, transboundary resource system? (2) Are the institutions that have evolved at each of three levels of decision-making--state/tribal, intertribal and intratribal-- effective in helping the relevant groups solve collective action problems? Do they reflect principles of allocative efficiency?; The results of this study suggest that: (1) In a number of important areas, the efforts of state and tribal regulatory agencies are complementary, and the management system has benefited from the inclusion of tribal managers. Some duplication of effort and mutual distrust remains. (2) Solving distributive conflicts is crucial in reaching allocatively efficient resolutions to collective action problems. (3) While a great deal about the structure of state-tribal, intertribal and intratribal institutions can be explained as the outgrowth of a series of narrowly rational actions, considerations of social identity and expressive rationality are also important in their evolution and design.