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An economic analysis of fuel adjustment clauses for utility regulation.

机译:公用事业监管的燃油调整条款的经济分析。

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摘要

The fuel adjustment clause (FAC) is the most fundamental means of automatically reducing regulatory lag. In this dissertation we focus on two aspects of FAC: the consequence of replacing FAC by futures trading and the impacts of including purchased power in FAC on a firm's choice of capacity level and own utility generation.;In the electric industry, utility-to-utility transactions are common place. Most states' public utility commissions (PUCs) allow purchased power costs being included in FAC. We construct a two-date model to study the impact of different degree of pass-through on a utility firm's choice of capacity level and own utility generation. Assume the utility generation function is of a Cobb-Douglas type, it is shown that the adjustment clause tends to discourage the risk neutral firm from investment in capacity when the demand is perfectly inelastic. Similar conclusions apply to the firm's output choice whenever the fuel cost accounts for more than a half of the total revenue. In case that the production process exhibit nearly constant return-to-scale, the adjustment clause always leads to less of own utility generation.;While the use of FACs is widespread and in most cases long-standing, they have been the object of numerous criticisms for several years. FACs reduce the incentive to search for the least cost source of fuel, distort the incentive to produce efficiently, and exacerbate problems associated with self-dealing. Much of the response to those criticism has been aimed at improving the design of the FAC mechanism. This dissertation explores and advances a completely new method for insuring the financial integrity of the utility but avoiding the incentive problems associated with the FAC. We demonstrate the FAC can, under certain conditions, be successfully displaced by futures trading. By efficiently transferring risk to speculators the utility can improve the welfare levels of risk averse ratepayer and itself. Thus, futures trading provides a Pareto improvement over the FAC.
机译:燃油调整条款(FAC)是自动减少监管滞后的最基本手段。在本文中,我们着眼于FAC的两个方面:用期货交易替代FAC的结果以及将购买的电力包含在FAC中对公司选择容量水平和自用电力的影响。公用事业交易很常见。大多数州的公用事业委员会(PUC)允许将购买的电费包含在FAC中。我们构建了两个日期的模型,以研究不同程度的传递对公用事业公司选择容量水平和自己产生公用事业的影响。假设效用生成函数是Cobb-Douglas类型的,则表明当需求完全缺乏弹性时,调整条款倾向于使风险中立的公司不愿意投资于容量。每当燃料成本占总收入的一半以上时,类似的结论也适用于公司的产出选择。如果生产过程显示出几乎恒定的规模回报,则调整条款总会导致更少的自己的公用事业产生。;尽管FAC的使用广泛且在大多数情况下是长期存在的,但它们已成为众多目标。批评了几年。 FAC减少了寻找成本最低的燃料来源的动机,扭曲了有效生产的动机,并加剧了与自我交易有关的问题。对这些批评的许多回应都旨在改进FAC机制的设计。本文探索并提出了一种全新的方法来确保公用事业的财务完整性,但避免了与FAC相关的激励问题。我们证明,在某些条件下,FAC可以通过期货交易成功取代。通过将风险有效地转移给投机者,公用事业可以提高规避风险的纳税人及其本身的福利水平。因此,期货交易相对于FAC提供了帕累托改进。

著录项

  • 作者

    Liu, Lihong.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Kansas.;

  • 授予单位 University of Kansas.;
  • 学科 Economics.;Economic theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1995
  • 页码 89 p.
  • 总页数 89
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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