The goal of this thesis is to explore the extent to which firms outsourcing their information systems function are able to form "partnerships" with their service provider. Prior IT outsourcing research, informed by economic theory, has generally focused on contracts; outsourcers are advised to craft a contract specifying in detail all aspects of the relationship. In addition, outsourcers are advised to outsource only those elements of the IT function which are easily monitored.; Many current outsourcing relationships seem to be at odds with this advice; companies are outsourcing IT elements subject to substantial monitoring uncertainty. In addition, the size and scope of some of these relationships creates a complexity which adds to monitoring difficulties. Our research tries to identify the governance level control mechanisms dyads employ to establish partnerships despite the presence of a substantial degree of uncertainty.; Chapter one introduces the phenomenon under study. Chapter two begins with an integration of economic and sociological theories from a governance level control perspective. Then a framework is presented for use in describing the interorganizational design elements which must be addressed by an outsourcing dyad. Finally, we develop a matrix; attributes from the several forms of governance control are linked to each of the specific interorganizational design elements. Chapter three further refines the framework used in our exploration, and explains our research methods and propositions.; Chapters four and five present the results from each of our sites. Chapter six relies on both sites to explore more deeply how trust can be relied upon as a governance level control mechanism.; The final chapter summarizes our research findings. Managerial implications and future research possibilities are discussed.
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