A theory of moral personhood in the thought of Karl Marx.

摘要

This thesis makes a case for attributing a specific theory of moral personhood to Karl Marx. Theories of moral personhood constitute sub-theories of moral theories and account for who has moral standing and what aspect of persons ought to be the content or primary focus of moral concern.;In the first chapter I deal with objections to the plausibility of attributing a moral theory to Marx. I argue that the moral point of view is consistent with Marx's account of thoughtways (including moral ideologies), historical determinism, and the scientific and partisan claims of his world-view. As well, the interpretation of Marx as espousing a normative rejection of morality is critically evaluated.;In the second chapter the issue of moral personhood is examined. This is in response to problematic assumptions both within the debate about the relationship of Marx to morality, and within moral philosophy in general. Issues subject to critical examination include the necessity of equality between moral persons and the view that deontological theories show greater respect for persons than do consequentialists ones. The relationship between theories of moral personhood and moral theories is also looked at.;The third chapter examines the various values that Marx expresses support for in an effort to determine which of these constitute the basic good or content of concern for persons. I argue that Marx's concern for persons is directed towards their objective or considered interests.;In the fourth chapter I show that Marx can be credited with a universal, and roughly prima facie equal, concern for persons including individuals who are capitalists and for persons from previous epochs and other cultures. By showing the plausibility of the view that Marx gives consideration to the well-being of these persons, I argue that they have standing in his evaluative considerations of history and revolutionary activity.;This thesis does not attribute a specific moral theory to Marx, nor does it prove that he thought he had a moral theory. What it argues for is the possibility of attributing to him a welfarist and pan-human theory of moral personhood.