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TEDDI: Tamper Event Detection on Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems.

机译:TEDDI:篡改分布式网络物理系统上的事件。

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摘要

Edge devices, or embedded devices installed along the periphery of a power grid SCADA network, pose a significant threat to the grid, as they give attackers a convenient entry point to access and cause damage to other essential equipment in substations and control centers. Grid defenders would like to protect these edge devices from being accessed and tampered with, but they are hindered by the grid defender's dilemma; more specifically, the range and nature of tamper events faced by the grid (particularly distributed events), the prioritization of grid availability, the high costs of improper responses, and the resource constraints of both grid networks and the defenders that run them makes prior work in the tamper and intrusion protection fields infeasible to apply.;In this thesis, we give a detailed description of the grid defender's dilemma, and introduce TEDDI (Tamper Event Detection on Distributed Infrastructure), a distributed, sensor-based tamper protection system built to solve this dilemma. TEDDI's distributed architecture and use of a factor graph fusion algorithm gives grid defenders the power to detect and differentiate between tamper events, and also gives defenders the flexibility to tailor specific responses for each event. We also propose the TEDDI Generation Tool, which allows us to capture the defender's intuition about tamper events, and assists defenders in constructing a custom TEDDI system for their network.;To evaluate TEDDI, we collected and constructed twelve different tamper scenarios, and show how TEDDI can detect all of these events and solve the grid defender's dilemma. In our experiments, TEDDI demonstrated an event detection accuracy level of over 99% at both the information and decision point levels, and could process a 99-node factor graph in under 233 microseconds. We also analyzed the time and resources needed to use TEDDI, and show how it requires less up-front configuration effort than current tamper protection solutions.
机译:沿电网SCADA网络外围安装的边缘设备或嵌入式设备对电网构成了重大威胁,因为它们为攻击者提供了方便的切入点,从而可以访问并损坏变电站和控制中心中的其他重要设备。网格防御者希望保护这些边缘设备不被访问和篡改,但是它们受到网格防御者的困境的阻碍。更具体地说,网格所面临的篡改事件的范围和性质(尤其是分布式事件),网格可用性的优先级,不正确响应的高昂成本以及网格网络和运行它们的防御者的资源限制都可以使之先行工作在本文中,我们对网格防御者的困境进行了详细描述,并介绍了TEDDI(分布式基础设施上的篡改事件检测),它是一种分布式的,基于传感器的篡改保护系统,专门用于解决这个难题。 TEDDI的分布式体系结构和因子图融合算法的使用为网格防御者提供了检测和区分篡改事件的能力,还使防御者可以灵活地为每个事件定制特定的响应。我们还建议使用TEDDI生成工具,该工具可让我们捕获防御者对篡改事件的直觉,并帮助防御者为其网络构建定制的TEDDI系统。为了评估TEDDI,我们收集并构建了十二种不同的篡改方案,并展示了如何TEDDI可以检测所有这些事件并解决网格防御者的困境。在我们的实验中,TEDDI在信息和决策点两个级别上都显示出事件检测的准确度超过99%,并且可以在233微秒内处理一个99节点的因子图。我们还分析了使用TEDDI所需的时间和资源,并说明了与现有的篡改保护解决方案相比,它需要更少的前期配置工作。

著录项

  • 作者

    Reeves, Jason.;

  • 作者单位

    Dartmouth College.;

  • 授予单位 Dartmouth College.;
  • 学科 Computer science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 190 p.
  • 总页数 190
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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