On the future of civilian plutonium: An assessment of technological impediments to nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

摘要

This dissertation addresses the value of developing diversion- and theft-resistant nuclear power technology, given uncertain future demand for nuclear power, and uncertain risks of nuclear terrorism and of proliferation from the reprocessing of civilian plutonium.;The methodology comprises four elements: Economics. An economic growth model coupled with market penetration effects for plutonium and for the hypothetical new technology provides a range of estimates for future nuclear demand. A flow model accounts for the longevity of capital assets (nuclear plants) over time.;Terrorism. The commercial nuclear fuel cycle may provide a source of fissile material for terrorists seeking to construct a crude nuclear device. An option value model is used to estimate the effects of the hypothetical new technology on reducing the probability of theft. A game theoretic model is used to explore the deterrence value of physical security and then to draw conclusions about how learning on the part of terrorists or security forces might affect the theft estimate. The principal uncertainties in the theft model can be updated using Bayesian techniques as new data emerge.;Proliferation. Access to fissile material is the principal technical impediment to a state's acquisition of nuclear weapons. A game theoretic model is used to determine the circumstances under which a state may proliferate via diversion. The model shows that the hypothetical new technology will have little value for counter-proliferation if diversion is not a preferred proliferation method. A technology policy analysis of the choice of proliferation method establishes that diversion is unlikely to be used because it has no constituency among the important parties to the decision, namely the political leadership, the scientific establishment, and the military.;Value. The decision whether to develop a diversion- and theft-resistant fuel cycle depends on the perceived value of avoiding nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The opportunity cost of such events is prohibitively difficult to assess. Instead, recent nonproliferation efforts and long term funding of organizations with nonproliferation objectives suggest a willingness-to-pay to avoid breaches in nuclear security. The cancellation of the Integral Fast Reactor in 1994 is analyzed using the methodology developed in the dissertation.