How are the ideas of logic, language, and meaning related? In this thesis I give an interpretation of the roles that these ideas play in the philosophy of W. V. Quine. In Chapter One, I consider Quine's reasons for rejecting the claim that there is a distinction between sentences that are true in virtue of meaning alone, and sentences that are true in virtue of facts about the world---that is, his reasons for rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction. In Chapter Two, I turn to a view of language that Quine thinks follows from his behaviorism---the view that our words have no determinate meanings and no determinate reference, except relative to what Quine calls a background language. In Chapter Three, I return to the idea of sentences which are true m virtue of meaning alone, but here I focus on the logical truths, which are a subset the analytic truths. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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机译：逻辑，语言和含义的观念如何相关？在本文中，我对这些思想在W. V. Quine哲学中的作用进行了解释。在第一章中，我考虑了奎因拒绝理由的观点，即仅凭意义就对的句子与因世界事实而对句子的区分是有区别的，也就是说，他拒绝的理由分析与综合的区别。在第二章中，我将介绍奎因从他的行为主义出发所遵循的语言观，即与奎因所称的背景语言相比，我们的词语没有确定的含义和确定的参照。在第三章中，我将回到句子的概念，这些句子仅凭意义就是真实的，但在这里，我将重点放在逻辑真理上，这些逻辑真理是分析性真理的子集。 （摘要由UMI缩短。）
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