This thesis consists of three independent essays in corporate finance and bargaining theory. In the first essay, I show that, in the context of n-person bargaining problems, it can matter greatly whether one studies axioms and solutions with respect to the entire feasible set or with respect to only the individually rational portion. It is demonstrated that a classical principle of individual monotonicity becomes much more powerful when all feasible agreements, not just individually rational ones, are considered. The n-person Leximin solution is uniquely characterized on the basis of individual monotonicity in conjunction with other plausible properties.; The second essay, which is co-authored with Eric Maskin, studies bargaining problems in economic environments. Unlike the classical Nash approach to bargaining, our approach does not impose the “welfarist” assumption that only the shape of the utility possibilities set is relevant to the bargaining. Thus we are able to consider bargaining solutions, such as fifty-fifty split of a single good, that depend on more than just utility information. We show that the axioms of Pareto efficiency, weak symmetry, and technological monotonicity combine to characterize welfare egalitarianism.; The third essay is an empirical study of corporate policies restricting executive options repricings over the period 1994–1998. I focus on the determinants of repricing policy and the consequences of repricing policy for executive compensation and turnover. I find that firms choosing liberal repricing policies exhibit higher CEO ownership, lower outside ownership, and greater insider representation on the board of directors compared to firms that adopt restrictions. Patterns of executive turnover surrounding repricing restrictions do not support the hypothesis that repricing flexibility is useful for executive retention. Finally, the sensitivity of total CEO pay to performance is seen to increase in response to a repricing restriction. These results suggest that CEOs may wield considerable power over the board of directors in compensation matters and that compensation design is intimately tied to the quality of internal governance mechanisms.
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