This dissertation investigates international influence strategies, such as deterrence and compellence, from a prospect theory perspective. It hypothesizes that the effects of the reference point on an adversary's risk preferences can be manipulated by the mixed use of incentives and disincentives. Also, the implications of framing were applied to the strategic circumstances of deterrence and compellence. This indicated that compellence may place the target state in the domain of loss and deterrence tends to be associated with the domain of gain, but that these divisions are do not hold universally. Moreover, the study suggests that the temporal orientation of positive and negative tactics---rewards and punishments are present-oriented while promises and threats are future-oriented---is an important consideration in their effective use. Thus, multiple sets of competing hypotheses were generated: (1) a simple set of expectations derived from prospect theory; (2) a more sophisticated model involving multiple steps and stressing the correct use of carrots and sticks, at appropriate times, and in the prescribed sequence; and (3) a set of conditions derived from the standard theories of rational deterrence and compellence. These hypotheses were tested by comparing three historical cases: (1) the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; (2) the prelude to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; (3) the nuclear and missile proliferation stand-offs between the United States and North Korea in the 1990s. Consistent with the hypotheses of the complex model, the results show that states can greatly affect their adversary's framing of the reference point before it is set. Additionally, after the opponent's baseline is established, the coercing state can minimize the target state's propensity to take risks by issuing an appropriate threat in the proper manner and, if called for, by offering a last-minute conditional inducement.
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