This thesis discusses the philosophical literature concerning the problem of developing naturalized theories of mental representation. The motivation for attempting to provide these theories is described, and analyzed in terms of the extent to which such theories are required to solve problems relating to the role that the representational theory of mind plays in the foundations of cognitive science. A set of standard problems that such theories face is described, and the ability of candidate theories, especially teleosemantics, to solve them is discussed. The homunculus problem and the indeterminacy problem are identified as particularly important. Proposals to solve these problems are discussed and a solution based on Dennett's decompositional strategy and Brook's self-representation theory is endorsed. The solution requires that a distinction between representational states at the psychological level and non-representational states at sub-psychological level be maintained, a consequence that is explained and defended. The applicability of this distinction to neurosemantic theories is discussed and recommended.
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