Domestic influences on United States arms control verification policy.

摘要

Many arms control treaties in force today rely on intrusive verification regimes. Intrusive arms control treaty verification regimes are reciprocal procedures authorizing teams of international inspectors into facilities to assist in determining if countries are abiding by an agreement. The problem is that United States confidential business information (CBI), and national security assets (NSA) may be compromised by permitting on-site inspections of US facilities. In most cases the United States played the dominant role in designing such regimes. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Protocol, currently being negotiated, are examples of agreements with intrusive inspections. This dissertation examines which domestic entity---government elite, bureaucrats, or Congress---had the most influence in the development of such intrusive arms control verification policy, and if such entity considered the implications intrusive inspections would have on CBI and NSA. The dissertation concludes that the elite had significant influence on the development of verification policy, and that the elite had not been overly concerned about the loss of confidential business information or national security information during intrusive arms control inspections.