Money in gubernatorial elections: Campaign finance lessons from the states.

摘要

Compared to congressional elections, gubernatorial races are underrepresented in the campaign finance literature. Yet the diversity of state campaign finance laws enables a comparative analysis of their impact on elections. I gather and analyze unique data on primary and general election spending in races for governor from 1980 to 2000. I use these data to test hypotheses about the effects of campaign finance laws and candidate spending on competition. The four chapters are organized to analyze the causes and effects of spending in primary and general elections.; The first two chapters examine challenger emergence and the determinants of campaign spending. In party primaries, I find that incumbents with high job approval ratings and those in states with party endorsements are more likely to be unopposed. In contested primaries, experienced challengers and those who accept public funding are better able to match incumbents' spending. In general elections, I find that contribution limits do not hold down overall spending. Acceptance of public funding and spending limits reduces spending, more so for incumbents than challengers. In the competition for funding between incumbents and challengers, I find that public funding and higher limits on party contributions help increase challengers' share of total spending.; The last two chapters examine the effects of spending on the primary and general election vote. Due to methodological problems in using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I use two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression to accurately measure the effects of spending. In primaries, spending by incumbent governors does not have an independent impact on the vote. Spending by their primary challengers is very effective, even after controlling for challenger quality and the governor's approval rating. In an analysis of the general election vote, I propose and test the theory that the magnitude of spending effects depends on challenger quality. I find that spending by incumbents has a visible effect on the vote only when they need it the least: in races with inexperienced challengers. Spending by challengers with statewide office experience is more effective than spending by lower quality challengers.