首页> 外文学位 >Caspian games: A dynamic bargaining game.
【24h】

Caspian games: A dynamic bargaining game.

机译:里海游戏:动态的讨价还价游戏。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

This Dissertation was written under the direction of Professor P.Terrence Hopmann. In this work, the author seeks to identify the independent variables affecting the outcome of three key decisions required of the international consortiums constructing Caspian oil export pipelines. The first of involves whether or not the enterprises developing the pipelines to export Kazakh oil, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (“CPC”), and Azeri oil, the Azerbaijan International Operating Consortium (“CPC”), cooperate by utilizing the same route or utilize separate energy export corridors. Second, I analyzed how the actual Main Export Pipeline route (“MEP”) for Azeri oil was selected by the AIOC. Finally, I tried to understand the factors driving the residual equity positions in each consortium. I was particularly interested in the equity position of Russian state and commercial interests in each consortium.; I approached the puzzle as a multilevel bargaining problem. Hence, the preferences of each relevant actor (state and corporate levels) were assessed. The covering theory utilized was rational choice. An application of game theoretic modeling, particularly Bayesian analysis (used as a metaphor), accounted for the learning process resulting from the strategic interaction between actors. I sought to understand greater the refinement of each actor's perception of counterpart preferences. Additionally, the Gordon Constant Growth Model (“CGM”) and the Sharp's Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) were utilized to relate multinational actors preferences, achieving a cost of capital based hurdle rate, to political risk.; My end findings demonstrate this interrelationship and provide a clear argument for great power states to persuade newly developing Caspian states to adopt a more transparent, and credible approach to corporate governance. This revised state strategy will reduce multinationals' perception of political risk, lower firms' cost of capital (hurdle rate), and increase the funding of major energy development projects, which will stimulate economic and political development.
机译:本论文是在特伦斯·霍普曼教授的指导下编写的。在这项工作中,作者力图找出影响构建里海石油出口管道的国际财团所需的三个关键决定的结果的独立变量。第一个问题涉及开发管道以出口哈萨克石油,里海管道财团(“ CPC”)和阿塞拜疆石油(阿塞拜疆国际运营财团(“ CPC”))的企业是否利用同一路线进行合作或利用独立的能源出口走廊。其次,我分析了AIOC如何选择阿塞拜疆石油的实际主要出口管道路线(“ MEP”)。最后,我试图了解驱动每个财团的剩余股权头寸的因素。我对俄罗斯国家的产权状况和每个财团的商业利益特别感兴趣。我将这个难题视为一个多层次的讨价还价问题。因此,评估了每个相关参与者(州和公司级别)的偏好。所采用的覆盖理论是理性选择。博弈论模型的应用,特别是贝叶斯分析(用作隐喻),解释了参与者之间战略互动所产生的学习过程。我试图更好地理解每个演员对对方偏好的理解。此外,利用戈登恒定增长模型(CGM)和夏普的资本资产定价模型(CAPM)将跨国行为者的偏好与政治风险联系起来,从而实现了基于资本的障碍率成本。我的最终发现证明了这种相互关系,并为大国劝说新兴的里海国家采取更透明,更可靠的公司治理方法提供了明确的论据。修订后的国家战略将减少跨国公司对政治风险的认识,降低公司的资本成本(障碍率),并增加大型能源开发项目的资金投入,这将刺激经济和政治发展。

著录项

  • 作者

    Michaud, Dennis Wright.;

  • 作者单位

    Brown University.;

  • 授予单位 Brown University.;
  • 学科 Political Science International Law and Relations.; Business Administration Management.; Economics Commerce-Business.; Energy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2002
  • 页码 376 p.
  • 总页数 376
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 国际法;贸易经济;贸易经济;能源与动力工程;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号