In this dissertation, there are three models of spatial games. First two models are based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and the last one is based on an extended version of the Coordination game. In the first model, the effects of dynamic payoff matrices on evolution of cooperation are studied based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game on a two-dimensional square lattice. The study is conducted by simulations and an analytical theory based on mean-field approximation. Payoff matrices are designed to evolve depending on a ratio of defectors (or cooperators) to the whole population. Introducing such payoff matrices allows the modeling dynamic aspects of societies. In the second model, the effects of disordered networks on evolution of cooperation are studied based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game on random regular relational graphs. It is observed that the fraction of cooperators that is a dynamical aspect of the system decreases as the network is becoming more disordered. Additionally, nothing special is observed at a parameter range where "small-world" phenomena occur. In the third model, diffusion of two competitive technologies is studied under the framework of a spatial game where consumers are distributed on a two-dimensional square lattice and play 3 by 3 symmetric coordination-like games with their nearest neighbors. Payoff matrix elements in the games are dynamic. It has been observed that equilibrium selection is highly dependent on parameters and initial configuration when there are positive effects of both global and local externalities.
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