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Tax Savings as a Provision of Corporate Welfare is a State-Corporate Crime When it Becomes Socially Injurious.

机译:当企业社会福利受到损害时,节税作为企业福利的一种规定是一种国家企业犯罪。

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摘要

This study focuses on the corporate welfare provided by the US government to corporations despite their high profits and argues that the significant and negative consequences to the federal and state tax bases of such welfare make it a state corporate crime. Failure to stabilize or rollback corporate welfare initiatives has resulted in a significant decrease in the percentage of federal and state revenue that comes from corporate tax contributions. I use structural equation modeling to analyze the consequences of corporate welfare initiatives on the federal tax base and the California state tax base. Drawing insights from an integrated theory of state-corporate crime developed by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), I examine various forms of deviance and collusion between corporations and the federal government. Specifically, this study explores this collusion on two levels: the structural and organizational levels. In terms of time period, I focus on the period before, during and after the implementation of corporate welfare initiatives and the organizational environment of the two groups involved. This study reveals that the federal government facilitated state corporate crime in this case by continuing to provide tax breaks, investment incentives, and loans to corporations despite the high yield in corporate profits, declining corporate tax contributions, high delinquency rates on loans, and the continuous outsourcing of jobs. Because of the lack of government oversight, or deregulation, corporations were able to take advantage of the tax-exempt restructuring offered by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Revenue Act of 1987, and tax credits beginning with Economic Recovery Act of 1981. This resulted in social harms that were associated with declining tax contributions to state and federal governments, namely a growing deficit, cutbacks in vital social services, and an increased tax burden among individual taxpayers.
机译:这项研究着眼于尽管利润丰厚的美国政府向公司提供的公司福利,并且认为此类福利对联邦和州税基的重大和负面影响使其成为州公司犯罪。无法稳定或回滚公司福利计划已导致来自公司税收的联邦和州收入百分比显着下降。我使用结构方程模型来分析公司福利计划对联邦税基和加利福尼亚州税基的影响。从Kauzlarich和Kramer(1998)提出的国家公司犯罪综合理论中获得见解,我研究了公司与联邦政府之间各种形式的偏差和合谋。具体而言,本研究在两个层次上探索这种合谋:结构层次和组织层次。在时间方面,我重点介绍实施企业福利计划之前,之中和之后的时期以及所涉及的两个小组的组织环境。这项研究表明,尽管公司利润丰厚,公司税收贡献减少,贷款拖欠率高且持续不断,联邦政府通过继续向公司提供税收减免,投资激励和贷款来促进州公司犯罪。工作外包。由于缺乏政府的监督或放松管制,公司得以利用1986年的《税收改革法》和1987年的《收入法》提供的免税重组以及从1981年的《经济复苏法》开始的税收抵免。与对州和联邦政府缴纳的税款减少有关的社会危害,即赤字增加,重要社会服务的削减以及个人纳税人负担的增加。

著录项

  • 作者

    Nery, Annebelle.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Riverside.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Riverside.;
  • 学科 Statistics.;Sociology Criminology and Penology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 101 p.
  • 总页数 101
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:45:17

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