We, the high contracting parties: A constitutional economics theory of regional integration.

摘要

At its most general, the question behind this research is, "Why do states choose to integrate?". The answer which this research tests is developed from constitutional economics. It states that, in order to benefit from a reduction in externality costs, states choose between unilateral, multilateral, and integrative means of organization so as to minimize not solely the externality costs, but the sum of those externalities and the decision-making costs of the means of organization to reduce those externalities. In the case of integrative organization, states must consider as part of the latter type of cost the autonomy costs---the cost of accepting the consequences of adverse collective decisions. Without institutional limitation, these costs may prevent states from adopting integrative organization where it otherwise produces the greatest reduction in externality for the lowest cost in decision-making.; Current explanations tend to explain particular moments in integration, but not the sequence of moments. For example, neofunctionalism tends to explain well the outcome of integration, but not other outcomes, while neorealism tends to explain well unilateral outcomes, but not integration. This makes it difficult for either to explain sequences of events which include more than one form of organization. Similarly, intergovernmentalism tends to explain the current moment, but does not systematically explain the entire sequence of events.; The cases considered in this dissertation are integration in legal, monetary, and banking regulation spheres. The evidence in these cases involves data on the citation of European legal provisions, the rate of growth in intra-EU trade, the volume of cross-border banking activity, and interviews with relevant German and European officials. Testing the thesis against these cases shows that the constitutional economics theory produces an explanation which supplies the wants of other theoretical explanations. In particular, it provides a systematic explanation for the timing of integration, while at the same time providing an explanation for state behavior more generally (i.e., outside of integration).