Power and international economic integration: Comparing institutions of regional economic integration.

摘要

This study examines the effect of power distribution in conjunction with other political determinants on regional economic integration in the contemporary world. Formal economic integration has increased significantly over the past 50 years among various regions of the world. With interest in the increase as well as variety of formal economic integration, this research project addresses the questions as to why and how states pursue formal economic integration and some go even further.;The extant literature offers mixed results on the effect of power distribution concerning international cooperation. I thus propose a theoretical framework, which shows multiple paths toward formal economic integration. The framework comprises structural conditions (such as power distribution and domestic characteristics of the states involved), perceptional conditions (such as perceptual equity of distribution of benefits), socio-economic transactions (such as international trade), and political networks (such as joint membership in intergovernmental organizations).;Chapter 4 theorizes the effect of the dynamics of changing power gap difference on the likelihood of forming, joining, and developing formal economic integration. I argue that the relationship between changes in power ratio and the level of formal economic cooperation is curvilinear. Additionally, states that experience decreasing power gap differences are more likely to develop formal economic integration when they are bound by preexisting cooperative agreements. Findings largely support the power gap difference hypothesis and add to our knowledge that the dynamic shift, in addition to the static distribution, of economic power gives incentives for states to pursue economic cooperation.;Chapter 5 formulates theoretical propositions based on the notion of conjunctural causation. Employing fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), multiple paths toward plurilateral regional economic agreements are revealed. In particular, I focus on two joint sufficient conditions: (1) the presence of power preponderance in conjunction with a group of states with homogeneous domestic polity and (2) the strong intraregional trade interdependence in conjunction with power parity among countries should lead to the formation of formal regional economic integration.;Chapter 6 examines the theoretical propositions that are formulated by fsQCA in the settings of within-case analysis. Employing process-tracing techniques, I find that these propositions are supported. In addition, I discover crucial political conditions---the strong willingness of the leading state and the need for reconciliation among members, especially between the regional hegemon and the regional contender---for the states to move toward formal economic integration.